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Do Child Development Accounts Promote 
Account Holding, Saving, and Asset 
Accumulation for Children’s Future?:  
Evidence from a Statewide Randomized 
Experiment 
 
 
This study examines the impacts of Child Development Accounts (CDAs) on account holding, saving, and asset 
accumulation for children, using data from the SEED for Oklahoma Kids experiment (SEED OK). SEED OK, a 
policy test of universal and progressive CDAs, provides a 529 college savings plan account to every infant in the 
treatment group with automatic account opening and an initial deposit. SEED OK also encourages treatment 
participants to open their own 529 accounts with an account opening incentive and a savings match. Using a sample of 
infants randomly selected from birth records (N=2,670) and randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, this 
study runs probit and OLS regressions. Analyses show significant differences between treatment and control groups in 
all outcome measures in the targeted accounts. Nearly 100 percent of the treatment group accepted the automatically-
opened state-owned account. Compared to 1 percent of the control group, 16 percent of the treatment group hold a 
participant-owned account. On average, the treatment group has saved significantly larger amounts in participant-
owned accounts, although a difference in savings amount is modest between the two groups ($47 vs. $13). A difference 
in total 529 assets of $1,040 is estimated between the treatment and control groups. These early findings from SEED 
OK suggest that CDAs have positive effects on savings and asset accumulation for children’s future development. 
Further research is required to test long-term cost effectiveness of CDAs. 
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Account holding and assets accumulated for college education may promote long-term 
socioeconomic development of young people through multiple pathways. Empirical evidence 
suggests that household assets, especially financial assets, have a positive association with children’s 
educational attainment and other developmental outcomes (Conley, 2001; Lerman & McKernan, 
2008; Nam, Huang, & Sherraden, 2008). Most obviously, college savings can help pay for 
postsecondary education. College savings may motivate young people to study hard and prepare for 
college by increasing their confidence in financing higher education. Savings for college may teach 
young people about financial management and nurture future orientation (Nam, Huang, & 
Sherraden, 2008; Shapiro, 2001; Sherraden, 1991). Despite the potential benefits of asset holding, 
many families have little savings, especially families headed by members of racial and ethnic minority 
groups and individuals with low levels of education. The median value of financial assets of families 
led by nonwhites is $9,000 (Bucks et al., 2009), less than the average cost of one year at a public 
four-year university (National Center for Education Statistics, 2009). The level of asset ownership of 
non-high-school graduates is even lower, with median financial assets of $3,000 (Bucks et al., 2009).  
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A low level of savings among families in general, and among vulnerable populations in particular, 
suggests inadequate institutional supports for asset accumulation for long-term development. 
Although individual characteristics (e.g., education) and behaviors (e.g., financial management 
practices) are closely related to saving and asset accumulation, institutional constructs, such as 
access, incentives, and information also shape individuals’ saving behavior and outcomes (Beverly, 
1999; Beverly et al., 2008). In addition, recent empirical evidence shows that low-income families 
can save in structured and subsidized accounts, though saving remains difficult (Duflo et al., 2006; 
Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden, 2001; Sherraden & McBride, 2010).   
Recognizing both the role of institutional supports (e.g., asset-building policies for children) and the 
difficulties associated with saving, several countries, including Canada, Singapore, South Korea, and 
the United Kingdom, have adopted Child Development Accounts (CDAs). CDAs are savings 
accounts for children that provide a structured opportunity to save and accumulate assets by 
providing access, information, and incentives (Cramer & Newville, 2009; Sherraden, 1991). Some of 
these policies—for example in Singapore and the United Kingdom—have implemented a structure 
that provides an initial deposit to CDAs (Loke & Sherraden, 2009).1 By design, many CDA policies 
are paternalistic, with initial deposits, matching deposits, and restrictions on withdrawals and use of 
funds. Interest in CDAs has grown also in the United States, as shown by legislative discussion of 
several bills at the federal level: the America Saving for Personal Investment, Retirement, and 
Education (ASPIRE) Act, 401Kids Accounts, and Baby Bonds (Cramer & Newville, 2009).  
Despite increasing interest, we know little about asset-building programs for children’s long-term 
development. Existing studies have focused mainly on asset-building programs for adults, e.g., 
retirement savings programs—such as 401(k)s and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)—and 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) for low-income adults (Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2004; 
Engelhardt & Kumar, 2007; Madrian & Shea, 2001; Nam, McKernan, & Ratcliffe, 2008; Poterba, 
Venti, & Wise 1995; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). Since savings goals for adults are likely different 
from those for children, previous studies are limited in informing us about CDAs. A small number 
of empirical studies of CDAs rely mostly on observational data collected on program participants 
(Le Grand, 2009/10; Mason et al., 2010; Nam & Han, 2010). Without comparable control groups, 
these studies are unable to establish causality since they cannot rule out the possibility that positive 
savings outcomes in these programs may have been caused by factors other than CDAs (Orr, 1999).  
This study investigates the impacts of a CDA program on savings outcomes, using data from SEED 
for Oklahoma Kids (SEED OK). SEED OK is a policy test of a universal and progressive CDA. 
SEED OK is universal in that it opens a savings account on behalf of every infant in the treatment 
group, and is progressive in that it offers additional incentives to infants from low- and moderate-
income families. In terms of study design, SEED OK is a social experiment using a probability 
sample. The sampling frame is birth records of every infant born in Oklahoma during certain 
periods in 2007. Following the baseline survey, the sample was randomly assigned into a treatment 
and a control group, thus creating an ideal condition for estimating intervention effects and 
establishing causality. Since random assignment generates a control group that can be expected to be 
equivalent to the treatment group except for access to the treatment (saving incentives and 
                                                 
1 In Singapore’ Baby Bonus program, the initial deposit ranges from US$3,000 to 6,000, more than US$2,000 to 4,000. 
In the United Kingdom, the Child Trust Fund from 2005 through 2010 had an initial deposit of £250 to 500, or over 
US$300 to 600.  
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information in our study) and sampling variability (Orr, 1999), differences in savings outcomes 
between the two groups can be attributed to SEED OK impacts.  
Background 
Despite increasing interest in asset-building policies, especially those for children’s future (Cramer & 
Newville, 2009; National Governors Association, 1997; Sherraden, 1991), knowledge of 
effectiveness is far from conclusive. For example, we have not yet reached consensus on whether 
asset-building policies and programs increase savings among target populations (Duflo et al., 2006, 
2007; Engen, Gale, & Scholz, 1996; Grinstein-Weiss, Zhan, & Sherraden, 2006; Mills et al., 2006; 
Poterba, Venti, & Wise, 1995, 1996; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). Researchers do not agree on the 
effectiveness even of retirement saving programs, which have been investigated more than other 
types of asset-building programs. Some researchers find that 401(k)s and IRAs are effective tools in 
promoting retirement savings because a substantial proportion of savings in these retirement 
accounts are net savings, not transferred from other types of assets (Poterba, Venti, & Wise, 1996, 
1995), while others maintain that these programs influence only the allocation of savings and wealth 
but not the amount of total savings (Engen, Gale, & Scholz, 1996). Results on saving incentives for 
low- or moderate-income adults are also mixed. Using experimental data from the American Dream 
Demonstration (ADD), a matched saving program for low- and moderate-income adults, Mills and 
colleagues (2008) show that ADD moderately increased homeownership rates among renters, but 
did not have significant effects on other types of assets and net worth. Duflo and her colleagues 
(2006) tested a saving match program in an experiment at H&R Block’s tax preparers’ offices. Their 
findings demonstrate that the offer of a savings match significantly and substantively increased low-
income tax filers’ enrollment rates and contribution amounts to IRAs. In comparison with the H&R 
Block saving match program, the federal Savers’ Credit retirement savings incentive is estimated to 
have much smaller effects on IRA contributions, although it provides the same level of economic 
benefits in the form of a tax credit (Duflo et al., 2007). The differing effects of H&R Block’s savings 
match program and the Savers’ Credit tax incentive suggest that not only the amount of incentive, 
but also the form of incentive, influences saving programs’ impacts on a target population’s savings 
(Duflo et al., 2006, 2007).  
Invaluable as it is, empirical evidence on adults’ saving and asset-building programs is limited in 
helping us understand CDAs. First, savings goals are different: Adult saving programs promote 
savings for retirement, homeownership, or small business start-up, while CDAs encourage mostly 
education. Second, the beneficiaries of savings programs are usually identical to savers in adults’ 
programs but this is not always true of CDAs, especially in cases where very young children are the 
beneficiaries.  
Few existing empirical studies have examined the effects of CDAs on savings and asset 
accumulation for children’s future. According to Dynarski (2004), tax-based college saving accounts, 
such as 529 college savings plans and Coverdell programs, rarely benefit low-income families since 
these families’ economic gain from tax deductions is small or nonexistent, and savings in these 
accounts could possibly reduce college financial aid. As a result, economically and socially 
advantaged groups are more likely to save in these programs than those in disadvantaged groups, as 
reflected by higher median income and net worth and a higher percentage of college-educated 
parents among participants (Dynarski, 2004).  
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Universal or progressive CDA programs seem to be more effective in helping a wider range of 
families than tax-based programs. For example, after the United Kingdom implemented the Child 
Trust Fund (CTF) and offered saving vouchers to every infant born after August 31, 2002, the 
average monthly saving amount for children rose from £15 to £24 (or $23 to $36) (Le Grand, 
2009/10). Another study also estimated that the CTF increases savings for children, especially for 
those who would have no or very low levels of assets in the absence of the policy, although its 
impact on net household saving may be negligible (Jacobson, 2010). Similarly, in Korea’s Child 
Development Account program for children in the child welfare system, savings increased for the 
majority of CDA participants after the implementation of the program (Nam & Han, 2010). 
Although participants’ own saving amounts are moderate—an average of $30 per quarter—a CDA 
program in the United States has helped children from low- and moderate-income families 
accumulate substantial amounts in their accounts (an average of $1,518) by encouraging them to 
save and depositing saving incentives into their accounts (Mason et al., 2010).  
A few studies examine effects of specific program features on savings outcomes. Automatic account 
opening is consistently estimated to be effective in promoting enrollment in savings programs. 
Automatic account opening is a tool for overcoming inertia by opening accounts for eligible 
individuals without requiring them to initiate account-opening procedures. Automatic—or default—
account opening still allows participants to opt out of a program by requesting account closure or 
non-opening. Participation rates in 401(k) plans are substantially higher in programs with automatic 
account opening compared to those requiring sign-up (Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2004). Moreover, 
positive effects of automatic account opening are most evident among those who are traditionally 
low savers: younger employees, lower-paid employees, and African-Americans and Hispanics (Choi, 
Laibson, & Madrian, 2004; Madrian & Shea, 2001). Automatic account opening, however, does not 
necessarily increase saving amounts. The level of deposits (contributions) is often lower in an 
automatic account opening plan than in an opt-in plan, especially when the default contribution rate 
is low (Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2004; Madrian & Shea, 2001).  
A savings match is another program feature frequently used to promote savings. There is evidence 
that the availability of a savings match increases participation rates, especially among low-wage 
workers (Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2004; Huberman, Iyengar, & Jiang, 2007). However, it is not 
clear whether higher match rates raise saving amounts. Some studies find positive associations 
between match rates and saving amounts (Duflo et al., 2005), while others show no or even negative 
associations (Engelhardt & Kumar, 2007). In contrast, higher match limits (maximum amount of 
savings eligible for matches) are associated with higher savings amounts (Mason et al., 2010; 
Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). For example, controlling for many individual and program features, 
one study estimates that every one dollar increase in the match limit in IDAs is associated with a 
more than 50 cent increase in IDA savings (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). 
In this study, we examine the effects of a universal and progressive CDA policy test on account 
holding, individual savings, and total asset accumulation, using data from the SEED OK 
experiment. This study focuses on CDAs, while the majority of existing studies investigate asset-
building programs for adults. This study differs from existing empirical studies on CDAs, which lack 
a control group and use data from a non-probability sample. The current study uses experimental 
data collected from a probability sample and, therefore, conducts more robust tests on the impacts 
of CDAs. 
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The SEED OK “Treatment” 
The overall purpose of the SEED OK experiment is to test a universal and progressive policy of 
life-long asset building beginning at birth. The primary questions of interest are: (1) Can a universal 
policy of asset-building accounts be successfully put in place, i.e., can accounts be opened for and 
held by all or nearly all in the target -population? (2) To what extent do individuals save in OK 529 
accounts and how much? (3) How much assets accumulate in the accounts? (4) Do the accounts 
themselves and/or assets accumulated in the accounts affect attitudes and behaviors of parents, and 
later outcomes for children, especially cognitive, behavioral, and educational outcomes? These 
comprise the key policy questions in SEED OK. 
The second question above, which asks about individual savings performance, is meaningful and is 
addressed in this paper, but it is not the sole rationale for the SEED OK experiment. Questions 1, 3, 
and 4 are also important for this policy test, because SEED OK is a test of a universal and 
progressive asset-building policy. That is to say, SEED OK is designed not only to estimate the 
impact of CDAs on individuals’ savings performance but also to test overall impacts of CDAs on 
the target population, including attitudes and behaviors of parents and children. This paper focuses 
on the first three questions related to account holding, savings, and asset accumulation.2  
SEED OK is a partnership among the State of Oklahoma (Treasurer’s Office, Department of 
Health, Department of Human Services, Tax Commission, and Oklahoma College Savings Plan), the 
Center for Social Development (CSD), and RTI International (RTI). The SEED OK account 
structure uses the Oklahoma College Savings Plan, or OK 529, an existing state-sponsored 529 
savings program that was created to help families save for postsecondary education. 529 plans 
provide tax incentives for college savings: Investments grow tax-free if used for qualified education 
expenses. In the OK 529 plan, contributions up to $10,000 per year (or $20,000 for couples filing 
jointly) are deductible on the state income tax return. Money in 529 accounts may be used at both 
in-state and out-of-state eligible educational institutions. Non-qualified withdrawals of investment 
earnings (but not contributions) are subject to federal and state taxes and an additional 10 percent 
federal tax (Oklahoma 529 College Savings Plan, n.d.).  
In addition to the 529 plan tax incentives, SEED OK offers its own financial incentives. All 
treatment participants: 1) received $1,000 in a state-owned OK 529 account for their child; 2) were 
encouraged to open their own (private, not state-owned) 529 account with the opportunity for a 
time-limited $100 account-opening incentive;3 and 3) are offered a match to deposits made in their 
participant-owned accounts, if income-eligible. SEED OK provides a 1:1 savings match to 
treatment participants whose households’ annual adjusted gross income (AGI) is below $29,000 and 
a 0.5:1 match to those with an AGI from $29,000 to $43,499.  
                                                 
2 Data related to the fourth question will be collected later in follow-up surveys in the SEED OK experiment. 
3 The Oklahoma 529 plan, OCSP, requires a $100 minimum initial contribution to open a new account. To remove any 
financial barriers to account opening, SEED OK deposited the required $100 initial contribution for treatment 
participants who opened an account by April 15, 2009. In consideration of administrative delays, SEED OK deposited 
the $100 incentive for all treatment participants who opened an OK 529 account by May 15, 2009. Treatment 
participants opening their account after that date must deposit the $100 themselves.  
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Some observers might dismiss this experimental test as not meaningful because individuals did not 
actually save the $1,000 seed deposit, but this interpretation would be too narrow. As stated above, 
the main purpose of SEED OK is a policy test for universal and progressive policy for account 
holding, long-term asset accumulation, and later developmental outcomes; it is not simply a test of 
individual savings performance.  
The essence of the experimental test is to implement the treatment, and then test for the impacts of 
interest at a later point in time. In this regard, the presence of SEED OK funds at a later point in time 
is an impact of the experiment. This would be similar, for example, to offering a job as an 
employment strategy, then measuring jobs held at a later point in time. Nor is individual action or 
agency required for testing an experimental policy impact. Some policy interventions are quite 
paternalistic in the sense that institutions instead of individuals do most of the ―behaving.‖ A test of 
a savings program with automatic enrollment can increase holding of accounts later (e.g., Madrian & 
Shea, 2001), even though individual choice is not fully responsible.  
Other observers may ask whether a $1,000 initial deposit is a realistic policy test, a good question. 
Several countries have Child Development Accounts with initial deposits (Loke & Sherraden, 2009). 
In the most generous case of Singapore, several thousand dollars are universally available at birth, 
and thousands more in saving matches in the early childhood years. The total amount of public 
funds available for each child in Singaporean CDAs exceeds $30,000 (Loke & Sherraden, 2009). 
Singapore is the most generous CDA example, and we cannot predict what will happen in the 
United States, but CDA policy proposals have been introduced in the Congress that include initial 
deposits (Cramer and Newville, 2009). 
The SEED OK policy test consists of automatic (or ―default‖) 529 account opening with an initial 
deposit, unless the participant actively opts out. Following random selection into the treatment 
group, the Oklahoma Treasurer’s Office communicated to treatment participants the details of the 
$1,000 deposit for their child, the opportunity to open their own OK 529 account and save further, 
and information about how to take advantage of SEED OK savings incentives. As described above, 
SEED OK uses the Oklahoma 529 Plan as the vehicle for its accounts, so the standard 529 materials 
(e.g., account application and disclosure booklet) were provided to all SEED OK treatment 
participants.4 Each treatment child, as the account beneficiary, receives a quarterly statement 
showing the amount of money in the state-owned account. All communications specific to SEED 
OK supplement the standard 529 materials. 
Prior to the account opening incentive deadline (April 2009), treatment participants received 
communications reminding them of the opportunity to open an account and receive the $100 
account opening incentive. In addition, treatment participants receive postcards and e-mails 
encouraging them to save, and periodic reminders that a state-owned 529 account has been set up 
for the benefit of their child. Communications also remind treatment participants about the savings 
match incentive, available through December 31, 2011, to encourage them to save for their child’s 
education. In order to calculate the match, treatment participants were asked to send a one-time 
Match Eligibility Form (MEF) that permits the Oklahoma Tax Commission to search their tax 
records annually to determine income eligibility for the savings match (Zager et al., 2010).  
                                                 
4 The OK 529 has a standard account application and disclosure booklet that provides legal details of the account for all 
account openers, whether or not they are SEED OK participants. 
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A universal CDA policy would ideally have a single account structure. If the policy vehicle is a 
college savings plan, there would be a single 529 plan account for each participant holding all 
deposits and earnings. However, as an artifact of the SEED OK experiment and the existing state 
policy structure, a single account structure was not possible.5 Accordingly, SEED OK has three 
different types of 529 accounts (Table 1): state-owned, participant-owned, and other private 
accounts. First, a state-owned account was automatically opened on behalf of every SEED OK 
treatment child, with an ―opt-out‖ option. Therefore, every treatment child has a state-owned 
account unless his/her parents declined the offer by notifying the State of Oklahoma. This account 
holds SEED OK incentives that consist of a $1,000 ―seed‖ deposit and matches on individual 
savings in participant-owned accounts. State-owned accounts are available only to the treatment 
children because, by design, the control group does not receive SEED OK financial incentives. 
Because of the long time horizon (the children will be 18 years old or older when they use the 
funds), the 529 Balanced Option—a mix of stocks and bonds—was selected as the investment 
vehicle for money in the state-owned accounts.6 Each treatment child, as the account beneficiary, 
receives a quarterly statement showing how much money is in the state-owned account. Money in 
state-owned accounts can be used only for the child’s postsecondary education, and non-qualified 
withdrawals are not permitted. These withdrawal rules distinguish state-owned accounts from 
participant-owned and other private accounts where 529 plan withdrawal rules apply. As described 
above, money in participant-owned and other private accounts can be withdrawn for unqualified 
purpose although owners would pay a financial penalty (Zager et al., 2010).  
Second, a participant-owned account is available to both treatment and control participants. SEED 
OK encouraged treatment participants to open a 529 account with a time-limited offer of a $100 
opening incentive, savings matches, and information on 529 accounts. In contrast, control 
participants were offered no SEED OK financial incentives or information about 529s, although 
they are free to open 529 accounts or any other savings account, the same as any individual not 
participating in the study. Participants who open their own 529 account can choose from a variety of 
investment options, including an equity fund, a bond fund, a balanced fund, a guaranteed option, 
and age-based funds. Owners of participant-owned accounts receive quarterly statements (Zager et 
al., 2010).  
Third, other private 529 accounts can be opened for SEED OK children by individuals other than 
the study participants, such as other family members or friends. This type of account is available to 
both treatment and control groups. SEED OK does not provide any incentives or information 
specifically for owners of other private accounts in either group (Zager et al., 2010). 
As stated above, the policy test conducted in SEED OK is the concept of a single account, as if the 
different 529 accounts were merged. Due to administrative constraints, separate accounts exist, but 
                                                 
5 SEED OK preferred to retain ownership of the initial deposit and matching funds. Therefore, these contributions were 
made in state-owned OK 529 accounts, with the child named as beneficiary. In this way, access to SEED OK incentives 
in state-owned accounts is restricted for the intended purpose of postsecondary education. In addition, separating 
deposits made by treatment participants from those made by the State of Oklahoma prevents the state-owned accounts 
from jeopardizing families’ eligibility for federal financial aid for college or other public benefits. If a CDA policy were 
available to all Oklahoma residents, the OK 529 plan structure could be changed to separate state-owned assets from 
deposits made by individual families via separate investment portfolios in a single account. 
6 The value of the state-owned account rises and falls with the financial markets since it is invested in the Balanced 
Option. There is no guaranteed interest rate for this OK 529 investment option. 
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this is not the key point. The key point is that treatments in SEED OK receive automatic opening, 
deposits, and saving incentives, while controls do not, although controls can open a 529 account 
whenever they want, with no restrictions. This is the nature of the experimental test in SEED OK. 
The impact test in this study is on account holding, individual savings, and asset accumulation in 529 
accounts. We do not measure any asset reshuffling that may occur. At this stage in SEED OK, we do 
not have data on changes in other assets and liabilities in the household and, therefore, we are not 
able to conduct an impact test on net worth.  
Table 1. SEED OK 529 Account Structure and Incentives by Treatment Status 
 Treatment Control 
State-owned 
529 Account 
State-owned 529 account opened 
automatically for child with $1,000 
deposit. 
 
Savings into participant-owned 529 
account is matched and deposited into 
state-owned account, if income-eligible. 
No state-owned account for child. 
Participant-
owned 529 
Account 
Participant-owned 529 account opening 
encouraged. 
Time-limited $100 account-opening 
incentive offered. 
529 account (or any other savings 
account) may be opened. 
No information or incentives offered. 
No savings match. 
Other Private 
529 Account 
Anyone (e.g., family member or friend) 
may open other private accounts for 
child.  
No SEED OK financial incentives. 
Anyone (e.g., family member or friend) 
may open other private accounts for 
child. 
No SEED OK financial incentives. 
 
Methods 
Data and sample 
The SEED OK experiment sample consists of infants randomly selected from the birth records of 
all infants born in two three-month periods in 2007 (April through June and August through 
October).7 The SEED OK experiment oversampled three minority groups—African Americans, 
American Indians, and Hispanics—using a stratified random sampling method to ensure sufficient 
statistical power for separate analyses. By using birth records as the sampling frame, SEED OK was 
able to create a sample of potential study participants that is representative of the target population: 
infants born in Oklahoma.  
                                                 
7 The SEED OK experiment drew a second sample of infants among those born between August and October in 2007 
because of a lower response rate from the first sample than expected.  
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The Oklahoma State Treasurer sent a letter that invited the primary caretakers (mostly mothers) of 
selected infants to participate in the SEED OK study. These letters were followed up on by the 
survey research firm. The invitation letter informed potential study participants (those selected for 
the study) that they had a 50–50 chance of receiving a 529 account with a $1,000 seed deposit for 
the child if they participated in the study. SEED OK experiment participants who completed the 
baseline survey received $40 for their time.  
Among 7,328 infants selected from birth records, 213 cases were excluded because they were 
ineligible (e.g., due to the death of the infant or mother). Out of 7,115 eligible potential participants, 
caregivers of 2,704 infants agreed to participate in the study and completed telephone interviews, a 
response rate of 38 percent. Out of 2,704 completed interviews, 218 interviews were conducted in 
Spanish. The baseline survey was conducted from fall 2007 though spring 2008 (Marks, Rhodes, & 
Scheffler, 2008; Zager et al., 2010). 
The study participation rate of 38 percent in SEED OK may seem low, but it was somewhat 
anticipated. To put this in context, survey participation rates have continuously declined for many 
decades. For example, the survey participation rate declined from 72 percent in 1979 to 48 percent 
in 2003 in the Survey of Consumer Attitudes (Curtin, Presser, & Singer 2005), and from 36 percent 
in 1997 to 25 percent in 2003 in Pew Research Center’s national surveys using standard random 
digital dial method (Keeter et al., 2006). SEED OK study requirements may also have reduced the 
participation rate. Mothers were asked to provide their infant’s Social Security Number (SSN),8 a 
requirement to open an OK 529 account. The survey research firm anticipated unwillingness by 
mothers to disclose the child’s SSN, and therefore estimated a study participation rate of less than 50 
percent. Moreover, reluctance to provide SSNs may have been compounded by public education 
broadcasts in Oklahoma during the take-up period for the study, warning people to protect their 
SSNs and other identifiers. Finally, it is plausible that the low participation rate was due to 
skepticism about features in SEED OK. For some parents, a 50 percent chance of receiving a 
$1,000 deposit into their OK 529 account may have sounded too good to be true (Marks, Rhodes, & 
Scheffler, 2008; Zager et al., 2010).  
Although the low participation rate was expected, it nonetheless raises questions about external 
validity of study findings. In this regard, we note that higher response rates may not guarantee lower 
bias. Efforts adopted to increase study participation rates (e.g., repeated contacts) may 
disproportionally increase responses among those with high propensities for survey response, while 
having no effects on those with low propensity (Groves 2006; Keeter et al., 2000, 2006). To estimate 
nonresponse bias, we compare study participants and non-participants on observed variables in birth 
records. Analysis results indicate that SEED OK study participants do not differ from non-
participants in a statistically significant way for the following characteristics: infant’s race and 
Hispanic origin, gender, and birth-weight; mother’s marital status and metropolitan residency; and 
father’s age. SEED OK participants’ mean is significantly higher than non-participants at the 0.05 
level for the following characteristics: mother’s age (25.53 vs. 25.22 years), mother’s education (12.53 
vs. 12.22 years of schooling), and mother’s nativity (87 vs. 84 percent of native-born mothers). 
Overall, participants and non-participants do not differ significantly on many characteristics, and 
                                                 
8 This is another challenge of running an experiment compared to initiating a full policy. In a universal CDA policy, 
asking for the child’s SSN would not be an issue because the government could provide the SSNs and open accounts 
automatically. 
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even for characteristics with significant differences, gaps are not substantively large (less than one 
year of difference in mother’s education and age, and a three percent-point difference in native-born 
mothers). Nevertheless, it is possible that participants systematically differ from non-participants in 
unobserved characteristics (i.e., information not included in birth records), and therefore caution is 
still appropriate regarding external validity of study results. 
In analyses, we have used weighted data to adjust for study participation rates, as well as the 
oversampling of minority groups (Marks, Rhodes, & Scheffler, 2008). Weighting is a commonly used 
post-survey adjustment (Groves 2006).  
Following the telephone baseline survey, SEED OK randomly assigned 1,358 study participants to 
the treatment group and 1,346 to the control group. After the random assignment, SEED OK 
provided financial incentives and sent information packages9 only to the treatment group. In this 
way, the SEED OK experiment aimed to generate a condition where variation in access to an 
intervention (SEED OK incentives and information, in this case) was the only systematic difference 
between the treatment and control groups. That is to say, random assignment in SEED OK created 
a treatment group equivalent to the control group in both observed and unobserved characteristics, 
except for sampling variability. As a result, differences in outcomes can be attributed to the 
intervention itself, not to individual, environmental, or other characteristics that may be associated 
with study participants (Manski & Garfinkel, 1992; Orr, 1999).  
In assessing SEED OK’s treatment impacts, this study uses data from three sources: 1) birth 
records; 2) a baseline survey; and 3) Oklahoma 529 account and savings records. First, birth record 
data contain demographic information collected at or shortly after the birth of an infant. Second, 
baseline survey data were collected by RTI through telephone interviews before random assignment 
placed participants into the treatment or control group, as described above. The baseline survey data 
include more detailed demographic, socioeconomic, and family characteristic information than the 
birth records. Third, account and savings data have been provided each quarter by the OK 529 plan 
program manager through an agreement with the OK 529 plan board. The account data contain 
detailed information such as account balance, quarter-to-date, year-to-date, and life-to-date deposits 
and withdrawals, and owner relationship to beneficiary for every OK 529 plan account that lists a 
SEED OK child as the beneficiary. This study uses account data collected for the first 18 months of 
SEED OK (from January 1, 2008 when SEED OK participants were first notified of their treatment 
status through June 30, 2009).  
Among 2,704 study participants, the study excludes from analyses 22 participants who did not live in 
Oklahoma at the time of the baseline survey. Oklahoma residents potentially gain from the OK 529 
plan through state income tax benefits, while non-residents may be better off investing in a 529 plan 
offered by their state of residency. Non-resident control group participants may have an incentive to 
invest in a 529 plan outside of Oklahoma, and treatment group participants, regardless of their state 
                                                 
9 The notification of treatment status was sent to stage one participants in January, 2008 and to stage two participants in 
May 2008. A packet containing information about the OK 529 plan and SEED OK financial incentives was sent to 
treatment participants at the time of the notification. Some stage one participants (95 in the treatment group and 91 in 
the control group) were notified of their treatment status at the same time as stage two participants. SEED OK 
information packages were provided in Spanish to participants who indicated in the survey that it was their primary 
language. 
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of residency, have financial incentives to open an OK 529 plan account. Thus, non-residents were 
excluded because including them in the analysis sample might overestimate SEED OK intervention 
effects. 
In addition, the analysis sample excludes five study participants who are not parents of SEED OK 
children (grandparents or siblings of children), because the ability and willingness to save for SEED 
OK children may be different for non-parent guardians than for parents. The analysis sample also 
excludes seven cases with missing values for independent variables included in the analytical models 
described below. The final analysis sample consists of 2,670 cases.  
Measures  
The dependent variables include three types of savings outcomes: 529 account holding, individual 
529 savings, and total 529 assets. We have information on OK 529 accounts only, not on other 529 
accounts in other states that parents or others may have opened for infants. We assume that study 
participants are unlikely to hold 529 accounts administered by other states because the OK 529 
provides tax advantages to Oklahoma state residents and we exclude non-Oklahoma residents from 
the sample. 
The first savings outcome measure is 529 account holding. This is a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether an OK 529 account was held for a child as of June 30, 2009. We assigned the value of ―1‖ 
to those with open accounts and ―0‖ to others. Second, individual 529 savings is the net deposit 
(deposits minus withdrawals) made by individuals, such as mothers, fathers, other relatives, or 
friends of SEED OK children during the observation period (January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009). 
This variable does not include SEED OK incentives. Third, total 529 assets is the net deposit to an 
account, including both SEED OK incentives and individual savings. SEED OK incentives consist 
of the $1,000 seed deposit plus any saving matches deposited in the state-owned account and the 
$100 account-opening incentive deposited into the participant-owned account. For the two 
continuous savings outcomes (individual 529 savings and total 529 assets), we created a logarithm of 
each measure for multivariate analyses. We assigned the value ―1‖ to cases with a zero or negative 
value10 before conversion so that the log conversion would not generate missing values.  
We created these three types of savings outcomes for each type of 529 account: state-owned, 
participant-owned, and other private accounts. In addition, we generated combined-account 
measures that consider all three account types together. The combined-account measure provides 
the best estimate of the impact of CDA policy where there would be a single account rather than 
multiple accounts. Given administrative difficulties in an applied policy test, this is the closest 
approximation to the central policy question in SEED OK. 
The main independent variable of this study is an indicator of treatment status (―1‖ for those in the 
treatment group and ―0‖ for those in the control group). In addition, we have created variables 
related to children, their primary caregivers, their households, and environmental factors. We use 
two child characteristic variables: race (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic African-American, non-
                                                 
10 One control participant made deposits ($1,113.82) before SEED OK was implemented (January 2008) and withdrew 
the money during the observation period. For this reason, this one case has negative values for individual savings and 
total assets.  
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Hispanic American Indian, and Hispanic),11 and gender (1 for male and 0 for female). Caregivers’ 
characteristics include age (24 or younger, 25 to 34, and 35 or older), education (less than high 
school degree, high school diploma or GED, and bachelor’s degree or higher), marital status 
(married or not), and nativity status (U.S. native or foreign-born).  
We have created seven variables of household characteristics. Household size has three categories: 
two or three members; four members; and five or more members. The number of children is 
categorized into households with only one child, two children, three or more children, or a missing 
value. Household income is measured before taxes and deductions for the past 12 months and 
categorized into three groups: income of less than $43,500, income equal to or more than $43,500, 
and missing income information. Homeownership is a dichotomous variable with ―1‖ for 
homeowners and ―0‖ for non-owners. Financial asset ownership is also a dichotomous variable. We 
have assigned the value of ―1‖ to households that own one or more types of the following assets: 
CDs (certificate of deposits), treasury bills, or corporate bonds; savings bonds; retirement accounts; 
other stocks or mutual funds; savings at home or with a trusted friend or family member; or other 
types of savings. We have assigned the value of ―0‖ to households that report not having any type of 
financial assets. Sixth, the language spoken predominantly at home is categorized as English, 
Spanish, or other languages. Lastly, an indicator of internet service at home is a dichotomous 
variable (1=yes; 0=no).  
We have also generated one macroeconomic indicator—the county unemployment rate—and one 
study recruitment-process variable—date of recruitment to the study. The county unemployment 
rate variable is constructed by averaging annual county-level unemployment rates from 2007 to 
2009. The unemployment rate information was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.12 As 
described above, SEED OK recruited study participants in two stages. We assigned the value of ―0‖ 
to those who were recruited between August and December, 2007 (stage one sample), and ―1‖ to 
those recruited between January and April, 2008 (stage two sample).  
Statistical approach  
Since the SEED OK experiment randomly assigned study participants to treatment and control 
groups before implementation of the intervention, a simple difference in means (or proportions for 
dichotomous variables) between the two groups indicates the impacts of the SEED OK 
intervention, unless there was sampling variability in the assignment process. In other words, the 
random assignment is intended to create a treatment group not systematically different from the 
control group in both observed and unobserved characteristics, except for their access to the 
intervention. For this reason, differences in outcomes may be attributed to the intervention itself, 
not to individual, environmental, or other characteristics that may be associated with study 
participants, when taking into account sampling variability (Orr, 1999).  
Accordingly, after presenting sample characteristics by treatment status, we undertake simple 
difference-in-mean analyses that compare savings outcomes between the treatment and control 
                                                 
11 The category of non-Hispanic whites includes 26 Asians. Due to the racial composition of Oklahoma, we could not 
include enough Asian infants to create a separate racial category. Analyses excluding Asians from the analysis sample 
produced results that do not substantively differ from those reported in this paper.  
12 http://www.bls.gov/lau/#tables 
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groups. Second, we run multivariate analyses to take into account sampling variability. We use probit 
regressions for dichotomous dependent variables (529 account holding for different types of 
accounts) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for continuous outcome variables (logarithm 
of individual 529 savings and total 529 assets).13 These multivariate analyses control for observed 
discrepancies between the two groups generated during the assignment process, and reduce the 
influence of sampling variability in estimating the intervention impacts (Orr, 1999). The analysis 
model is expressed as follows: 
Yi = β0+ β1*Ti + β2 *Xi + εi   (1) 
where Yi indicates the savings outcome (e.g., log individual 529 savings) for participant i; Ti 
denotes the treatment status; Xi is a vector of control variables; and εi indicates random 
error. 
In equation (1), the coefficient of the treatment indicator (β1) is the parameter of interest. It indicates 
difference in savings outcomes between the treatment and control groups after taking into account 
child, caregiver, household, and environmental characteristics. If the coefficient of the treatment 
indicator is statistically significant and positive, we can conclude that SEED OK improved the 
savings outcome of interest.  
Additional analyses on participant-owned accounts examine the impact of the match on savings 
outcomes. We run two separate sets of regressions: one with those whose household income is 
within the match eligibility level (below $43,500) and another with those whose income exceeds this 
level. Excluded from these analyses are those participants with missing values in the household 
income variable (n=103). The regressions by income group include the same control variables as the 
primary analyses described above, with the exception of an income variable. Since we divide the 
sample by income level, the income variable does not vary in each subgroup.14  
The savings match income eligibility measure used for these analyses, however, is imprecise. 
Treatment participants’ eligibility for the savings match is determined by the SEED OK program 
using household federal adjusted gross income (AGI), which is not available for this research. This 
study uses total household income collected from the baseline survey, which does not take into 
consideration deductions such as retirement account contributions. Thus, our measure of match 
eligibility is an estimate, does not correspond perfectly to true match eligibility, and may understate 
the number of participants who are income-eligible for the savings match. 
The analyses described here estimate the average causal effect of assignment on outcomes based on 
a conventional intent-to-treat approach (Lee et al., 1991; Orr, 1999). That is, we include everyone in 
the sample for individual 529 savings and total 529 assets analyses, regardless of their account 
holding status. We cannot separate out treatment participants who were motivated to open an OK 
                                                 
13 Tobit regressions may be used for these continuous dependent variables since they are left-censored (Greene, 2003). 
However, in most analyses in this study, Tobit regressions are not identified, because the numbers of left-censored cases 
are too large. When identified, Tobit regressions produced substantively identical results to those from OLS regressions 
reported here.  
14 In consideration that household income has variation with each income group, we run additional regressions after 
controlling for log household income. Analysis results from these additional regressions do not substantially differ from 
results reported in this study. Results from these robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.   
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529 account by the SEED OK treatment from those who would have opened an account even in 
the absence of SEED OK. Therefore, the traditional intent-to-treat approach is better than analyses 
including only account openers in assessing SEED OK’s impact on individual 529 savings and total 
529 assets, because the latter approach suffers from selection bias (Lee et al., 1991). The intent-to-
treat approach is able to estimate accurately the overall impact of SEED OK assignment on 
individual 529 savings and total 529 assets across the full population sampled, and this is the key 
policy consideration. 
To check the robustness of our findings, we undertake supplementary analyses. First, we run 
analyses using the whole sample in SEED OK including study participants who lived outside the 
state of Oklahoma and those who are not parents of the SEED OK child. Second, we run analyses 
after excluding the small number of Asians (n=26) from the sample. In the main analyses reported 
here, Asians are categorized in the same group as whites. Third, we test models with alternative 
measures of income and number of children in the household: One model uses continuous 
measures of the number of children in the household and household income (logarithmic form) 
instead of the categorical measures in the main model; Another model employs a categorical 
measure of income with four categories (less than $29,000, from $29,000 to $43,499, $43,500 or 
higher, and missing). Fourth, we also run regressions with the actual dollar amount of individual 529 
savings and total 529 assets, in addition to the logarithm form of continuous variables. Fifth, we run 
logit regressions on dichotomous dependent variables instead of probit regressions. Supplementary 
analyses produce results that are substantively identical to those reported in this paper.15 In all 
analyses in this study, including descriptive and multivariate analyses, we use weights that account 
for the oversampling of minority groups and nonresponse biases (Marks, Rhodes, & Scheffler, 
2008). 
Results 
Table 2 presents demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the SEED OK sample by 
treatment status. Treatment and control groups are not significantly different from each other in any 
variable at the 0.05 level, indicating that these two groups are comparable to each other at least for 
observed characteristics. A majority of SEED OK infants are non-Hispanic white and have high 
school graduates as their primary caregivers. The majority come from households with incomes 
below $43,500. The average annual county-level unemployment rate is 4.4  percent for both 
treatment and control groups. Oklahoma’s unemployment rates were much lower than the national 
average between 2007 and 2009 (authors’ assessment based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
information on state-level unemployment rates from http://www.bls.gov/lau/tables.htm).   
                                                 
15 Results from these supplementary analyses are available upon request. 
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Table 2. Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Sample by Treatment Status  
Variables  Treatment (%) Control (%) Total (%) 
Infant’s Characteristics 
Race      
            White 66.71 66.42 66.56 
African-American 8.77 9.02 8.90 
American Indian 11.45 11.45 11.45 
Hispanic 13.07 13.11 13.09 
Male 53.46 52.73 53.09 
Caregiver’s Characteristics 
Age    
            24 or younger 46.14 44.31 45.23 
25-34 47.40 47.18 47.29 
35 or older 6.46 8.50 7.48 
Education    
Less than high school 23.97 22.56 23.27 
High school graduate 55.89 59.96 57.91 
Bachelor’s or more  20.14 17.48 18.82 
Married 61.45 61.67 61.56 
U.S. native 90.14 90.00 90.07 
Household’s Characteristics 
Household size     
2 or 3 32.08 34.67 33.37 
4 33.20 32.26 32.74 
5 or more 34.72 33.07 33.90 
Number of kids    
1 33.69 36.90 35.29 
2 33.49 33.15 33.32 
3 or more 31.15 29.00 30.08 
Missing 1.67 0.94 1.31 
Household Income     
            Less than $43,500 65.75 67.17 66.46 
$43,500 or more 30.42 30.36 30.39 
Missing 3.83 2.47 3.15 
Home owner 42.09 41.77 41.94 
Financial assets  53.67 55.44 54.56 
Internet at home 58.11 57.53 57.82 
Language spoken at home     
            English 90.85 89.95 90.40 
Spanish 8.12 8.68 8.40 
Other 1.03 1.38 1.20 
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Other Factors 
County unemployment rate 4.44 4.44 4.44 
Recruited at stage 1 38.66 40.49 39.57 
Unweighted Sample Size  1,340 1,330 2,670 
Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. 
In testing the statistical significance between the treatment and control groups, we use χ2 tests for 
categorical variables and F-tests for continuous variables. 
Descriptive results 
Table 3 compares three types of savings outcomes between the treatment and control groups: 529 
account-holding rate, mean individual 529 savings amount, and mean total 529 assets amount. As 
described in the measurement section, individual 529 savings does not include SEED OK 
incentives, while total 529 assets does. Because SEED OK consists of three distinct types of 
accounts, we report separate results for each type of account and one summary measure that 
combines all three. Again, savings outcomes for combined accounts provide the best reflection of a 
single, unified account in a potential CDA policy. Results in Table 3 demonstrate large and 
statistically significant differences in all savings outcomes by treatment status, except for other 
private accounts.  
Account holding 
First, account-holding rates are significantly higher for the treatment group than for the control 
group, for all types of accounts except other private accounts. For state-owned accounts, all but one 
member of the treatment group has an account. One participant in this group declined the SEED 
OK offer (this treatment participant opted out of a state-owned account, stating that for religious 
reasons the family could not accept an account with earnings on capital). The account-holding rate 
for state-owned accounts among the control group is 0 percent by design.  
Results for participant-owned accounts also show a significant difference in 529 account-holding 
rates by treatment status (16.3 percent for treatments vs. 0.9 percent for controls). This result 
indicates that 16 percent of caregivers who received information on SEED OK accounts and 
incentives as part of the SEED OK intervention had opened and held a 529 account for their infant 
18 months after SEED OK began. In contrast, less than one percent of the control caregivers who 
did not receive the SEED OK intervention held an account for their infant.  
Account-holding rates for other private accounts are very low in both treatment and control groups 
(lower than two percent), and the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant. 
This finding is not surprising because SEED OK does not provide any financial incentives or 
information about 529 accounts to anyone other than primary caregivers of infants in the treatment 
group.  
Because of large differences in state-owned and participant-owned account-holding rates, the gap in 
529 account-holding rates in the summary account measure (all accounts combined) is large (99.9 
percent vs. 2.3 percent) and statistically significant. The results for combined-accounts emphasize 
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the huge impact on account-holding rates of automatic account opening, combined with an initial 
deposit.  
Table 3. Savings Outcomes and Impacts by Treatment Status (N=2,670) 
Account Type Treatment Control Difference  
529 Account-Holding Rate (%) 
State-owned 529 account 99.94 0.00 99.94** 
Participant-owned 529 account 16.31 0.92 15.39** 
Other private 529 account 1.81 1.43 0.38 
All 529 accounts combined  99.94 2.32 97.62** 
Individual 529 Savings (without SEED OK incentives), Mean ($) 
State-owned 529 account 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Participant-owned 529 account  46.95 12.93 34.02** 
Other private 529 account 14.72 27.55 -12.83 
All 529 accounts combined 61.67 40.48 21.19 
Total 529 Assets (with SEED OK incentives), Mean ($) 
State-owned 529 account 1002.13 0.00 1002.13** 
Participant-owned 529 account 63.25 12.93 50.32** 
Other private 529 account 14.72 27.55 -12.83 
All 529 accounts combined  1080.10 40.48 1039.62** 
** = p<.01  
Notes: 529 account-holding rates are percentages while the differences in account-holding rates are 
percentage-point differences. Individual 529 savings and total 529 assets amounts are mean U.S. 
dollar amounts for all treatment or control participants, regardless of whether or not they hold an 
account. In testing the statistical significance between the treatment and control groups, we use χ2 
tests for categorical variables and an F-test for continuous variables. 
Individual 529 savings 
The second panel in Table 3 reports results for individual 529 savings. Based on the intent-to-treat 
approach, we include both account holders and non-holders in these analyses. State-owned accounts 
have no individual 529 savings because, by design, they contain solely SEED OK incentives. The 
mean individual savings in participant-owned accounts is significantly higher in the treatment, a $34 
difference. However, the mean individual 529 savings in other private accounts does not 
significantly differ between the two groups. For all private accounts combined, the mean individual 
savings is also higher for the treatment group, but the $21 difference is not statistically significant. 
Total 529 assets 
The third panel in Table 3 reports results for total 529 assets. Again, we include both account 
holders and non-holders in these analyses. The mean 529 assets amount is significantly higher for 
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the treatment group than for the control group in the state-owned account, the participant-owned 
account, and all accounts combined. The mean assets amount in state-owned accounts is $1,002 for 
the treatment group, with the $1,000 initial seed deposit comprising almost all of the assets 
deposited and matches making up only 0.2 percent of deposits.16 For participant-owned accounts, 
the mean 529 assets amount is significantly higher in the treatment group ($63 vs. $13).  Total assets 
in other private accounts are the same as the individual 529 savings reported in the second panel, 
since other private accounts do not have any SEED OK incentives. The difference in mean total 
529 assets in combined accounts is $1,040 and is statistically significant.  
Multivariate results  
Table 4 reports results from multivariate analyses for state-owned accounts, participant-owned 
accounts, other private accounts, and all accounts combined.  
State-owned 529 accounts 
Column 1 in Table 4 reports results for total 529 assets in state-owned accounts. We do not run a 
probit regression on account holding because treatment status explains almost all variation in the 
probability of holding a state-owned account. We do not analyze individual savings in this account 
because state-owned accounts include only SEED OK incentives and no individual savings. Results 
demonstrate a large treatment effect on 529 assets in state-owned accounts, as indicated by the 
statistically significant and large coefficient for the treatment indicator. The treatment coefficient 
indicates that the treatment group’s assets amount is 998 times that of the control group if 
demographic, socioeconomic, and environmental factors are controlled [exp(6.906)=998]. As 
anticipated, none of the demographic and socioeconomic factors has a significant association with 
total assets in the state-owned account. Assets accumulated in state-owned accounts are solely 
composed of SEED OK incentives, which are directly linked with treatment status. 
Participant-owned 529 accounts 
Columns 2 to 4 in Table 4 present results for three savings outcomes in participant-owned accounts: 
account holding, individual 529 savings, and total 529 assets. Unlike state-owned accounts, 
demographic and socioeconomic factors have significant associations with savings outcomes for 
participant-owned accounts. Mother’s education has significantly positive associations with these 
outcomes, while household size has negative associations. Significant coefficients of demographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics may be expected because participant-owned accounts require 
participants’ own actions to open an account and save, unlike state-owned accounts.   
Results also show that SEED OK has positive impacts on savings outcomes in participant-owned 
accounts. First, the coefficient of the treatment indicator is statistically significant and substantially 
large in the probit regression on account holding (column 2), suggesting that SEED OK encouraged 
treatment participants to open and hold a 529 account. Marginal-effect estimation shows that the 
                                                 
16
Caregivers in the treatment group were required to return a Match Eligibility Form (MEF) to receive a saving match, 
and 424 out of 1,361 in the treatment group had returned the form as of June, 2009. In addition, among those who 
returned the MEF, 72 caregivers made deposits in their participant-owned accounts. Accordingly, a small percentage of 
the treatment group received a match on their savings (1.8 percent), which resulted in a very low average saving match.  
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predicted probability of account holding is 20 percentage-points higher in the treatment group than 
the control group when demographic and socioeconomic factors are taken into account.17 Second, 
the regression results for individual 529 savings show a moderate but significant effect of the SEED 
OK treatment: The individual savings amount in the treatment group is 1.4 times that of the control 
group when characteristics of the child, caregiver, household, and environment are taken into 
account (column 3). Last, the treatment coefficient in the total 529 assets regression is also 
significant and large. The coefficient size indicates that a treatment group member’s total assets 
accumulated in participant-owned accounts are estimated to be 2.2 times that of a control group 
member with comparable characteristics (column 4).   
Other private 529 accounts 
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4 present results for other private accounts. Treatment status does not 
have a statistically significant impact on savings outcomes in other private accounts, while mother’s 
education, family economic conditions (income and financial asset ownership), and having internet 
access at home have positive associations with savings outcomes. These findings are expected 
because other private accounts do not receive any financial incentives from SEED OK, but saving 
requires the same (or perhaps even more) deliberate action by family members, relatives, or friends 
as in participant-owned accounts. Those recruited in stage two are less likely to open an account and 
they have lower individual savings, reflecting their shorter time period for savings (infants selected 
for SEED OK at stage two were born about four months later than those selected at stage one). 
All 529 accounts combined 
The last three columns in Table 4 report results for all accounts combined. Treatment status has a 
large and statistically significant coefficient in every analysis. The account holding result shows that 
SEED OK increased the treatment group’s chance of account holding by 95 percentage points. This 
extremely large effect reflects the almost universal account-holding rate for state-owned accounts. 
The treatment effect for individual savings is also statistically significant, but the effect size is small: 
The individual 529 savings amount of the treatment group is 1.3 times that of the control group, 
similar to the marginal effect of participant-owned accounts. The total assets accumulated in 529 
accounts of the treatment group are estimated at 899 times that of the control group; almost all of 
this difference is due to the $1,000 seed deposit. 
                                                 
17 For account-holding status, we estimate the marginal effect of SEED OK treatment by comparing predicted 
probabilities between the treatment and control groups with comparable characteristics. We calculate each group’s 
predicted probability under an assumption that an infant is a typical case in the sample: a white male infant whose 
caregiver is a 25 to 34-year-old married native-born woman with a high school degree; whose household consists of two 
to three members and has only one child with income less than $43,500; whose household does not own a home but has 
financial assets; whose household has internet service at home and speaks mainly English; whose county’s 
unemployment rate is 4.5 percent during the observation period; and whose caregiver was recruited for SEED OK at 
stage one.   
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Table 4. SEED OK Treatment Effects Based on Regression Analyses 
 State-
owned Participant-owned Other private All accounts combined 
 Log Total  
Assets  
Account 
Holding  
Log 
Individual 
Savings  
Log Total 
Assets  
Account 
Holding  
Log 
Individual 
Savings  
Account 
Holding  
Log 
Individual 
Savings  
Log Total 
Assets  
Marginal Effect 
+ 
998.25a 19.73b 1.38a 2.20a 1.51b 1.00a 94.95b 1.34a 898.75a 
Treatment 6.906** 1.799** 0.325** 0.788** 0.196 -0.002 16.740** 0.296** 6.801** 
 (0.005) (0.180) (0.056) (0.070) (0.170) (0.035) (1.498) (0.063) (0.039) 
Infant’s Characteristics 
Race 
African 
American 
-0.000 -0.285 -0.087 -0.127 -0.406 -0.008 -0.876** -0.090 -0.048* 
(0.001) (0.176) (0.045) (0.083) (0.379) (0.032) (0.313) (0.057) (0.023) 
American 
Indian 
0.006 -0.186 -0.039 -0.096 -0.229 -0.022 0.407 -0.064 -0.011 
(0.006) (0.142) (0.042) (0.062) (0.280) (0.027) (0.281) (0.048) (0.028) 
Hispanic 0.003 -0.356 -0.102 -0.099 0.508 0.142 0.696 0.045 0.073 
 (0.005) (0.282) (0.055) (0.106) (0.279) (0.084) (0.461) (0.096) (0.065) 
Male -0.004 0.264* 0.026 0.100 0.103 0.037 0.413 0.065 0.066 
 (0.005) (0.107) (0.057) (0.071) (0.161) (0.034) (0.264) (0.063) (0.038) 
Caregiver’s Characteristics 
Age 
25-34 -0.006 0.233 0.059 0.076 0.272 0.035 0.470 0.094* 0.040 
(0.006) (0.125) (0.037) (0.063) (0.251) (0.025) (0.429) (0.043) (0.025) 
35 or older -0.004 0.455* 0.117 0.259 0.452 0.065 0.579 0.193 0.076 
(0.003) (0.185) (0.127) (0.155) (0.329) (0.127) (0.634) (0.167) (0.124) 
Education          
HS graduate 0.012 0.489** 0.013 0.105 3.236** -0.024 4.302** -0.010 -0.017 
(0.012) (0.186) (0.026) (0.057) (0.316) (0.014) (0.501) (0.029) (0.019) 
BA or more 0.020 1.148** 0.569** 0.906** 3.927** 0.295** 5.757** 0.791** 0.359** 
 (0.015) (0.225) (0.121) (0.156) (0.341) (0.071) (0.632) (0.135) (0.076) 
Married -0.007 0.143 -0.017 0.040 0.003 0.008 0.173 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.138) (0.032) (0.059) (0.222) (0.013) (0.372) (0.034) (0.016) 
U.S. native -0.008 0.387 -0.068 0.101 -0.052 0.005 0.458 -0.066 0.014 
(0.006) (0.317) (0.120) (0.138) (0.271) (0.057) (0.679) (0.129) (0.044) 
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Household’s Characteristics 
Household size 
4 -0.000 -0.416* -0.176** -0.217* -0.580 -0.034 -0.462 -0.194* -0.083 
(0.002) (0.195) (0.064) (0.097) (0.469) (0.047) (0.404) (0.076) (0.047) 
5 or more -0.003 -0.591 -0.109 -0.202 -0.900 -0.048 -0.889* -0.149 -0.084* 
(0.004) (0.357) (0.073) (0.139) (0.467) (0.040) (0.442) (0.080) (0.041) 
Number of kids          
2 0.003 0.311 0.058 0.147 0.078 -0.064 -0.547 -0.005 -0.066 
(0.003) (0.192) (0.056) (0.091) (0.456) (0.041) (0.416) (0.067) (0.036) 
3 or more -0.001 0.475 0.009 0.165 0.356 -0.050 0.050 -0.052 -0.045 
(0.002) (0.374) (0.077) (0.148) (0.455) (0.041) (0.406) (0.085) (0.036) 
missing 0.001 0.142 -0.046 -0.011  0.004 -0.477 -0.050 0.027 
(0.004) (0.564) (0.070) (0.145)  (0.033) (0.511) (0.076) (0.034) 
Income          
≥ $43,500 0.004 0.270* 0.165* 0.193 0.362 0.092** 0.375 0.234** 0.071 
(0.005) (0.134) (0.076) (0.106) (0.200) (0.036) (0.362) (0.084) (0.037) 
missing 0.004 -0.713 -0.069 -0.178  -0.023 0.320 -0.084 -.001 
(0.006) (0.383) (0.061) (0.0.99)  (0.018) (0.399) (0.064) (0.021) 
Home owner -0.010 -0.027 0.045 0.037 -0.039 0.021 -0.531 0.062 -0.010 
 (0.010) (0.135) (0.043) (0.073) (0.194) (0.019) (0.286) (0.048) (0.026) 
Financial assets 0.005 0.209 0.050 0.101 0.536 0.029* 5.780** 0.078* 0.037* 
(0.005) (0.121) (0.035) (0.059) (0.277) (0.014) (0.883) (0.038) (0.014) 
Internet at 
home 
0.008 0.099 0.054 0.043 0.658 0.028* 0.733 0.079* 0.018 
(0.007) (0.131) (0.034) (0.061) (0.337) (0.014) (0.377) (0.037) (0.023) 
Language spoken at home         
Spanish 0.004 0.458 0.055 0.077 -0.530 -0.121 0.975 -0.085 -0.058 
(0.005) (0.453) (0.107) (0.143) (0.449) (0.087) (0.628) (0.134) (0.066) 
Other 0.006 1.207** 0.393 0.510  -0.180* -1.177 0.237 -0.123 
(0.009) (0.452) (0.385) (0.418)  (0.070) (0.728) (0.408) (0.086) 
Other factors          
Unemployment 
rate 
0.003 -0.141* -0.031 -0.060 0.103 0.018 0.123 0.005 0.013 
(0.004) (0.065) (0.024) (0.036) (0.108) (0.015) (0.122) (0.027) (0.012) 
Recruited at 
stage 2 
0.005 0.182 -0.055 0.068 -0.386* -0.080* -0.277 -0.135* -0.065 
(0.005) (0.103) (0.049) (0.063) (0.149) (0.035) (0.237) (0.057) (0.035) 
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Constant 0.022 -4.010** 0.152 -0.325 -6.742** -0.047 -14.249** 0.181 0.115 
 (0.027) (0.523) (0.203) (0.258) (0.650) (0.103) (1.814) (0.221) (0.095) 
Observations 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,508 2,670 2,670 2,670 2,670 
(Pseudo) R2 ++ 0.999 0.339 0.108 0.178 0.292 0.053 0.954 0.136 0.957 
 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Account holding analyses use probit regressions, and individual savings and total assets analyses employ OLS. 
+ The marginal effect of the treatment for a continuous dependent variable (individual savings and total assets) is calculated as the exponential of the 
treatment status coefficient since we log-transformed the dependent variable before running OLS regression. Each marginal effect in the table indicates 
the ratio of savings/assets amount of the treatment group to that of the control group (denoted with a).The marginal effect for a dichotomous 
dependent variable (account holding) is calculated by subtracting predicted probability of the control group from that of the treatment group with 
comparable characteristics. The treatment effect of account holding is estimated with percentage-points (denoted with b).  
+ + R2 values are presented for the OLS regressions and Pseudo-R2 values are presented for the probit regression analyses. 
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SEED OK treatment effects on participant-owned accounts by income  
Table 5 presents analysis results from two sets of regressions with two different subsamples on 
participant-owned accounts: One subsample consists of those participants whose household income 
is within the match eligibility and another with those whose income exceeds this level. These 
analyses test whether the savings match incentives in SEED OK increase savings in participant-
owned accounts. If the SEED OK treatment effect is estimated to be larger among those eligible for 
the savings match vs. those ineligible, we may conclude that the savings match has positive effects 
on participant-owned accounts.    
Table 5. SEED OK Treatment Effects on Participant-Owned Accounts by Household Income: 
Regression Analyses 
Savings Outcome Income Eligible  
for Savings Match 
Income Ineligible  
for Savings Match 
529 Account Holding 2.094 *** 
(0.392) 
1.764 ***   
(0.217) 
Log 529 Individual Savings 
a 
0.106 ***  
(0.027) 
0.917 *** 
(0.175) 
Log 529 Total Assets a 0.422 *** 
(0 .055) 
1.709 ***  
(0 .186) 
Observations  1,854 713 
 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05 
a A difference in coefficient sizes of treatment indicator is statistically significant between eligible and 
ineligible participants at the 0.05 level. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Account holding analysis uses probit regressions, and 
individual savings and total assets analyses employ OLS. Regression analyses include control 
variables included in Table 4: infant characteristics (race and gender); caregiver’s characteristics (age, 
education, marital status, and nativity); household’s characteristics (household size, number of kids, 
homeownership, financial asset ownership, internet at home, and language spoken home), other 
factors (unemployment rate and recruited at stage 2). We do not run analyses with a sample 
consisting of those missing household income information (n=103).  
Table 5 presents only the main results: coefficients and standard errors of the treatment indicator. 
Other variables not reported in Table 5 have expected results, such as positive relationships between 
education and savings.18 Table 5 shows that the SEED OK treatment has positive effects on savings 
outcomes among both match-eligible and ineligible groups for all three outcome measures: account 
holding, individual savings, and total assets. As mentioned in the Methods section, we can assess the 
impacts of matches by comparing the coefficient sizes of the treatment indicator between the two 
regressions groups: one with the income-eligible group and the other with the income-ineligible 
group. The first row summarizes results on account holding; the coefficient size of the treatment 
indicator is larger for the eligible group than the ineligible group. An adjusted Wald-test, however, 
shows that the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant. Analyses on 
individual savings and total assets produce contrasting results. The treatment indicator has a 
                                                 
18 Results on other variables in these analyses are available upon request. 
D O  C H I L D  D E V E L O P M E N T  A C C O U N T S  P R O M O T E  A C C O U N T  H O L D I N G ,  S A V I N G ,  A N D  A S S E T  
A C C U M U L A T I O N  F O R  C H I L D R E N ’ S  F U T U R E ?  
 
 
 
 
 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
25 
significantly larger coefficient among the ineligible group than the eligible group. These results 
suggest that the SEED OK treatment has increased individual savings and total assets among the 
ineligible group to a significantly larger extent than among the eligible group. These findings are the 
opposite of what was expected under the assumption that the savings match has positive impacts on 
savings outcomes.   
Discussion 
As noted, the SEED OK experiment is a policy test of a universal and progressive Child 
Development Account (CDA) that gives every child an account at birth, with automatic account 
opening and an initial deposit. This paper examines impacts of SEED OK on savings in a CDA for 
college, using data from a state-wide experiment. SEED OK opened a state-owned account with a 
$1,000 seed deposit on behalf of every infant in the treatment group. In addition, SEED OK 
encouraged treatment participants to open their own OK 529 accounts by providing information 
about accounts, a $100 opening incentive, and the possibility of savings matches (for low- and 
moderate-income caregivers). 
The design of the SEED OK experiment provides exceptionally good data for evaluating the 
impacts of CDAs on account holding and savings for college. The SEED OK sample was randomly 
selected from birth records of all infants born in Oklahoma in certain time periods. As an 
experiment, SEED OK has created a condition where the treatment and control groups are 
equivalent to each other except for their access to the SEED OK intervention and sampling 
variability. As the first experimental study of CDAs, SEED OK will continue to provide empirical 
evidence that can inform the development of CDA policy in the future.  
Findings of this study show positive impacts of the SEED OK intervention on savings outcomes in 
529 accounts. Due to automatic (―default‖) account opening and SEED OK incentives, nearly 100 
percent of the treatment group had a 529 account, compared to 2.3 percent of the control group. In 
addition, bivariate and multivariate analyses find significant differences between the treatment and 
control groups in all three outcome measures in the two targeted accounts: state-owned and 
participant-owned 529 accounts. 529 account-holding rates, 529 individual savings, and total 529 
assets are significantly higher for the treatment group than the control group. There are no 
significant differences in savings outcomes in other private 529 accounts (opened for the infant by 
other family members and friends), but this finding is expected because SEED OK did not provide 
any incentives for these accounts. This finding may also suggest that families and friends of 
treatment participants did not reshuffle resources among 529 accounts. The SEED OK intervention 
improved savings outcomes in the accounts targeted by the program, while not significantly 
decreasing savings in the non-targeted accounts.  
Turning to the effect of offering a savings match, the SEED OK treatment effect on account 
holding is larger among the income-eligible group than the ineligible group, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. At the same time, SEED OK treatment effects on individual saving and total 
asset amounts are significantly larger among the ineligible group rather than the eligible group. This 
finding is opposite of what would be expected under the assumption that offering a savings match 
would improve savings outcomes among the low- and moderate-income participants who are 
eligible for the match. These results suggest that comparison of treatment effects by income 
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eligibility may not be an effective method for assessing the impact of match. Income groups differ 
not only in terms of their eligibility to receive the savings match, but also in other unobserved 
aspects.  For example, the high-income group is likely to have more economic resources for saving 
(other than those included in the analysis), may have better financial management skills, and very 
likely have more advantageous tax treatment of their savings in a 529 plan. SEED OK participants 
are responding to this full set of conditions. Further research will be required to assess the effects of 
the match on savings outcomes.  
This study is not free from limitations. First, the sample is limited to infants born in Oklahoma. 
Therefore, findings of this study may not be generalizable to infants in other states or to the United 
States as a whole. However, Oklahoma was selected for SEED OK in part because of substantial 
subpopulations of African Americans, Hispanics, and American Indians, so there is racial and ethnic 
diversity in SEED OK. Second, data limitations do not allow us to examine SEED OK’s impacts on 
overall household assets and liabilities. Therefore, this study is unable to tell whether increased 
individual savings in 529 accounts are net savings encouraged by the SEED OK intervention or 
savings transferred from other types of assets. Third, the SEED OK study participation rate is 38 
percent. Although a low participation rate does not necessarily generate bias (Groves, 2006), it may 
raise the issue of external validity because we cannot fully test whether study participants’ propensity 
to save for their children’s future differs from that of non-participants. Last, this study used account 
data collected between January 1, 2008, and June 30, 2009, when the United States experienced one 
of the worst economic downturns in its modern history. Although Oklahoma’s unemployment rates 
were much lower than the national average, weak national economic conditions and uncertainty 
during the observation period may have affected savings outcomes in SEED OK. Further research 
with data from longer observation periods that cover both weak and robust macroeconomic 
conditions will help determine whether and how macroeconomic conditions might affect long-term 
impacts on savings outcomes.  
Findings of this study may have several policy implications. First, by demonstrating an acceptance 
rate of nearly 100 percent of automatically-opened state-owned accounts, this study suggests that it 
may be possible to put in place a CDA policy that reaches nearly all children. As stated previously, 
only one member of the treatment group opted out of the SEED OK state-owned account.  
Second, findings support the use of a centralized savings plan, such as a College Savings (529) Plan, 
as an institutional structure for achieving near-universal participation. The centralized structure 
enables identification, outreach, and implementation of highly paternalistic CDA features, such as 
automatic opening, subsidies, and restrictions on access and use of funds. In this regard, note again 
the effectiveness of automatic 529 account opening. The account-holding rate 18 months after the 
SEED OK intervention is much higher for state-owned accounts than participant-owned accounts 
among the treatment group: It is almost 100 percent for the state-owned account, but only 16 
percent for participant-owned accounts. This large difference is almost certainly due to program 
(policy) structure: State-owned accounts are opened automatically with the ability to opt out, but 
participant-owned accounts require participants’ own action to be opened. A lower account-opening 
rate for participant-owned 529 accounts, despite the $100 opening incentive, suggests the 
effectiveness of automatic program enrollment for a universal program. Although the difference in 
incentive amounts ($1,000 in state-owned 529 accounts vs. $100 in participant-owned 529 accounts) 
may also explain the huge gap in account-holding rates between the two types of accounts, 
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automatic account opening seems a more plausible explanation.  The account-holding rate in SEED 
OK is much higher than in MI SEED, another CDA program with comparable financial incentives 
($800 initial deposit and saving match) but without automatic account opening. The account-holding 
rate in the MI SEED program was only 62 percent in the treatment group (Marks et al., 2009). In 
addition, this interpretation is more consistent with results from studies on retirement savings, 
where automatic account opening in a 401(k) plan has increased program participation rates among 
eligible individuals (Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2004; Madrian & Shea, 2001). Considering that one 
of the most common reasons for non-enrollment is procrastination (e.g., ―too busy,‖ see Choi, 
Laibson, & Madrian, 2004; Huang, Beverly, Clancy, Lassar, & Sherraden, 2011), automatic account 
opening seems a reasonable solution to low participation rates.  
Third, program features other than automatic account opening also affect the account-holding rate. 
Findings show that the state-owned account-holding rate in SEED OK is much higher than that of 
401(k) plans with automatic account opening. Madrian and her colleagues (2001) estimated a 401(k) 
participation rate of 86 percent even when enrollment was automatic. Differences in participation 
rates between SEED OK and 401(k) plans with automatic account opening may be explained by 
different program requirements. Although saving is encouraged, SEED OK does not require 
participants to save their own money, while 401(k) participation mandates that employees contribute 
a certain percentage of their wages. SEED OK provides a $1,000 deposit to state-owned accounts, 
so those who opt out forfeit the assets deposited by SEED OK for their child. In addition, there is a 
difference in information regarding opt-out procedures. Potential participants in automatic 401(k) 
plans are usually informed by their employer of their right to opt out and the procedure to do so 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2000). However, SEED OK participants, after accepting participation 
into the study and agreeing that if selected into the treatment group a 529 account would be opened 
for them, are not informed of a procedure to opt out. Therefore, SEED OK participants must 
actively refuse the $1,000 state-owned account.  
Fourth, this study also demonstrates that saving incentives and information increased participants’ 
own savings for college. Treatment participants are significantly more likely to have participant-
owned accounts and save significantly larger amounts in their accounts than control participants, 
suggesting positive impacts of SEED OK on participant savings. One recent empirical study using a 
longitudinal data set suggests that holding a savings account in a child’s name, controlling for many 
other factors including savings amount, is associated positively with later educational outcomes 
(Elliott & Beverly, 2011). If this effect pertains in the future, then results of SEED OK may turn out 
to be promising. However, the amounts of participant savings in SEED OK, although statistically 
significant, are quite modest at this stage. If amounts of participant saving are the key factor in 
determining later child outcomes, then there is reason to be very cautious. We cannot know if 
participant savings rates in SEED OK will become greater or smaller over time.  
Also of relevance in this discussion, savings in SEED OK are in restricted 529 accounts. Restricted 
access protects savings from unplanned (and perhaps undesirable) withdrawals caused by hyperbolic 
discounting, which can overcome commitment to save for the long term (Laibson 1998). Therefore, 
SEED OK savings may increase the probability for savings being used for the intended purpose 
(development of children) in the future.  
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Overall, these initial results from the SEED OK policy experiment can be understood as positive in 
some ways, and perhaps disappointing in others. On the positive side, the impact of automatic 
account opening suggests that nearly every child may be able to have a savings account under a 
universal CDA policy. In addition, there is a significant difference in opening rates for participant-
owned 529 accounts (16 percent for treatments vs. one percent for controls). The 16 percent 
account-holding rate also compares favorably to 529 account-holding rates among all children in 
Oklahoma; less than four percent of all Oklahoma children under age 18 are named as the 
beneficiary of an OK 529 account (personal communications with Tim Allen, Deputy Treasurer, on 
June 24, 2011). Those participants that hold 529s are now ―in the game‖ with accounts that may be 
used for postsecondary saving going forward.  
On the disappointing side, the mean difference in amount of individual savings is not very high. 
This study uses early savings outcome data measured only 18 months after the program began, and 
the account-holding period coincided with an economic downturn. Still, the engagement of SEED 
OK treatment group members in saving their own money can fairly be called a slow start. 
Considering that its cost is substantial (e.g., financial incentives including the $1,000 initial deposit 
and savings matches, as well as program operation costs), SEED OK may not be an economically 
feasible program if its aim were solely to increase individual savings.  
The central question going forward is whether and how SEED OK overall (including subsidies and 
restrictions) might influence parents’ and children’s attitudes and final developmental outcomes. If 
SEED OK improves parenting practice and financial management skills, motivates parents and 
children to plan and prepare for college education, or increases high school graduation and college 
attendance rates among children, a universal and progressive CDA policy may be worth the 
investment. Because SEED OK has used random assignment successfully, it will be possible to have 
rigorous experimental data to address these important questions.  
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